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Previous studies have shown that agencification tends to reduce political control within a 
government portfolio. However, doubts have been raised as regards the robustness of these 
findings. In this article we document that agency officials pay significantly less attention to 
signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within ministerial (cabinet-level) 
departments. This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience 
of issue areas and officials’ rank. Simultaneously we observe that the three control variables 
all have an independent effect on officials’ attentiveness to a steer from above. In addition we 
find that the more organizational capacity available within the respective ministerial 
departments, the more agency personnel tend to assign weight to signals from the political 
leadership. We apply large-N questionnaire data at three points in time; spanning two 
decades and shifting administrative doctrines. 
 
 
Introduction1 
Two decades of New Public Management (NPM) reforms have made the 
agencification phenomenon highly topical and it has, not surprisingly then, attracted 
considerable scholarly attention. Students have focused on the causes of NPM 
agencification as well as on its consequences. Unfortunately, however, recent studies 
have been inconclusive as regards the extent to which agencification has resulted in a 
relative insulation of agency decision-making from political considerations 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006; 2007; Verhoest et al. 2004; Yesilkagit and Thiel 2008). 
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Drawing on large-N elite surveys covering three points in time (1986, 1996 and 2006), 
this article shows that:  
• Agency officials pay significantly less attention to signals from executive 
politicians than their counterparts in ministerial departments. This 
observation is shown to be robust by being consistent across time. 
• This finding holds when we control for variation in tasks, the political salience 
of issue areas, and officials’ level of position. The finding that agency officials 
in general are less exposed to political control than their counterparts in 
ministerial departments means that there might be more leeway for expert-
based decision-making or for taking other concerns into consideration within 
agencies, such as for example user and clientele interests. 
• Simultaneously, the article also demonstrates that these three control variables 
all have independent effects on the dependent variable.  
• In addition this study reveals that the more organizational capacity available 
in the respective ministerial departments, the more agency personnel tend to 
assign weight to signals from their respective ministers.  
 
By an ‘agency’ we mean an administrative body which is formally and 
organizationally separated from a ministerial, or cabinet-level, department, and 
which carries out public tasks at a national level on a permanent basis, is staffed by 
public servants, is financed mainly by the state budget and is subject to public legal 
procedures. Agencies are supposed to enjoy some autonomy from their respective 
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ministerial departments as regards decision-making, including decision-making in 
managerial, personnel and budgetary matters. However, the respective ministers 
normally keep the political responsibility for agencies’ activities (cf. Pollitt and Talbot 
2004). Historically, ministries have been arranged either as ‘integrated ministries’, 
meaning that a ministerial portfolio constitutes a unitary organization, or as a 
vertically specialised structure, meaning that a portfolio is split into a ministerial, or 
cabinet-level, department on the one hand and one or more separate agencies on the 
other. Contingent upon administrative doctrines, fads and fashions, and 
administrative policy objectives and calculations, agencies seem to have been moved 
out of and into ministerial departments, often in a cyclical manner (Aucoin 1990; 
Hood and Jackson 1991; Pollitt 2008; Verhoest et al. 2007). Thus, although NPM has 
placed agencification high on the administrative policy agenda, agencification and 
de-agencification have in fact made up one of the enduring themes of public 
administration.  
 
We proceed as follows: in the next section we develop the theoretical argument on 
the effects of agencification for political steering of the government apparatus. We 
then describe the data and method before we present the findings. Then follows a 
discussion on the robustness of the findings, implications for organizational design, 
and how semi-detached national agencies in European countries may re-couple into, 
and thus become parts of, an emerging multi-level European Union (EU) executive.   
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Agencification effects – the theoretical argument 
Our point of departure is the assumption that institutional forms do matter, not only 
in shaping individual actors’ strategies but also their preferences and identities 
(March and Olsen 1989). When analyzing agencification effects, we focus on one 
particular aspect of institutions, namely their organizational structure: we ask if 
assigning tasks to a body vertically separated from a ministerial department means 
that these tasks are dealt with differently than they would have been within a 
ministerial department. Thus, we assume that a certain drawing of organizational 
borderlines and specification of role expectations make a difference in terms of actual 
decision behaviour (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990). The argument is not that a 
particular structural design determines actors’ choices, rather that particular 
organisational forms make some choices more likely than others. This is not only due 
to the potential activation of rewards and punishments if role expectations are not 
met, but, perhaps even more important, due to the simplification that the 
organizational structure provides: it focuses attention on certain problems, solutions, 
consequences and conflicts while ignoring others. Given that individuals operate 
under conditions of ‘bounded rationality’ and limited cognitive capacities, a kind of 
‘perfect match’ occurs between the individual actor’s need for simplification on the 
one hand and the selection and filter that the structure provides on the other (Simon 
1965). Since a decision-maker is unable to attend to everything at the same time and 
to consider all possible alternatives and their consequences, he or she will tend to 
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concentrate on those issues that a particular organizational unit expects him or her to 
focus on (Augier and March 2001). 
 
In 2003 a review article summarized the findings on inter alia agencification effects 
(Egeberg 2003). It pointed to that although many of the same kinds of tasks are 
performed at the level of ministerial departments and agencies respectively (e.g. 
legislative proposals are worked out at both levels), policy choices are affected by the 
organizational context within which they are made: Compared with their 
counterparts in ministerial departments, agency officials exercise their discretion 
relatively insulated from ongoing political processes at the cabinet level (cf. also 
Greer 1994; Wood and Waterman 1991). Agency officials have relatively little contact 
with the political leadership of their respective ministries, with other ministerial 
departments than their parent department, and with parliament. Most typically they 
tend to give priority to professional considerations rather than political concerns, and 
they also usually assign more weight to user and clientele concerns than to signals 
from executive politicians. This loss of political control can be partly compensated for 
by strengthening relevant organizational units in the respective ministerial 
departments (‘organizational duplication’). In ministerial departments, on the other 
hand, top priority is given to signals from the minister but also to professional 
concerns. Considerably less emphasis is attached to user and client interests (Egeberg 
2003). Thus, the implication for organizational design seems to be that a vertically 
integrated ministry represents the best way to safeguard political control in all 
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phases of the policy process (Desveaux 1995; Hult 1987). Vertical specialisation 
through agencification may, on the other hand, secure that more independent expert 
considerations are fed into the policy process at various stages. Such a split between 
a ministerial department on the one hand and an agency on the other also seems to 
give user and client groups a stronger voice.  
 
NPM agencification studies seem to be less conclusive on effects as regards the 
degree of political control. In a review chapter, Christensen and Lægreid (2006: 30) 
emphasize that the de facto autonomy of agencies may vary according to various 
circumstances such as agency tasks and the political salience and conflict potential of 
an issue area. Thus, real agency autonomy might not correspond with formal 
autonomy (see also Yesilkagit and Thiel 2008). In this article we will control for such 
factors since there are good reasons to believe that they could be important. The 
question is, however, whether such variables are so strongly related to the amount of 
ministerial steering that the effect of organizational structure (agencification) 
disappears altogether. Accordingly, this could be the case if agency personnel deal 
with tasks that are typically ‘political’ - such as legislative proposals - allowing much 
discretion. ‘Political’ tasks could make agency officials subject to the same amount of 
political supervision as their colleagues in ministerial departments. In effect, 
agencification would not matter. Also, it might be the case that agency officials 
whose issue area is characterized by public debate and conflict are more inclined to 
attach importance to a political steer from the top. And, finally, if one controls for 
 7 
officials’ rank it could be that senior officials in agencies are as politically attentive as 
their counterparts in ministerial departments. When analyzing the relationship 
between officials’ organizational position (ministerial department versus agency) on 
the one hand and the weight officials assign to signals from their respective executive 
politicians on the other, our data allow us to control for the impact of these other 
variables across three points in time. Importantly, our data contain ‘pre-NPM 
observations’ (1986), ‘NPM observations’ (1996) and ‘post-NPM observations’ (2006). 
As regards agency personnel, our data allow us to investigate whether their political 
attentiveness is related to the amount of organizational capacity found within their 
respective ministerial departments. We will also show the relative importance of 
professional considerations and the importance attached to user and client interests. 
However, in the following analysis we will mainly focus on officials’ attentiveness to 
political signals from above as the dependent variable. 
   
Data and method 
This article relies on six large-N surveys within the Norwegian central 
administration - both at the ministry level and the agency level (see Table 1 below). 
Over the last 30 years, a group of Norwegian scholars have each decade conducted 
surveys in the Norwegian central administration (1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006). This 
study reports from the surveys from 1986, 1996 and 2006. The 1976 survey is not 
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included in our analysis because this survey did not incorporate agencies 
subordinate to the ministry level.  
 
Both the 1986 and the 1996 surveys consist of separate date files for ministry officials 
and agency officials, albeit no combined data file encompassing all government 
officials (see Table 1 below). Similarly, the 2006 survey consists of separate data files 
for ministry officials and agency officials, however, also including a combined data 
file that cover both ministry and agency officials (N = 3326). This combined 2006 file 
renders possible an analysis of the relationship between officials’ organizational 
position (ministerial department versus agency) on the one hand and the weight 
officials assign to signals from their respective executive politicians on the other 
hand, controlled for the three independent variables discussed in the former section 
(see Table 6 below). Consequently, a regression analysis that incorporates this 
organizational variable is possible by utilizing the combined 2006 data file.  
 
Whereas the surveys from 1986 and 1996 were distributed to the respondents by 
postal mail, the 2006 survey was conducted as an online survey by the Norwegian 
Social Science Data Service. As shown by Table 1, the total response rates have 
decreased only marginally during this 20 years period. The drop in response rates 
from 1996 to 2006 may partly stem from a change of survey technology from postal 
survey to online survey. The effects of survey technologies on response rates are 
largely unknown in the literature (Simsek and Veiga 2001: 224) and therefore difficult 
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to conclude in this particular study. One additional explanation for decreasing 
response rates may be a general fatigue among respondents towards surveys more 
broadly. The drop in response rate from 1986 to 1996 may reflect such a dynamic 
because both surveys were using the same technology (postal survey).  
 
All six surveys encompass officials from all Norwegian ministries (currently 18 
ministries in total) and subordinated agencies (currently 51 agencies in total). At all 
time periods, the survey at the ministerial level was sent to all officials at the level 
equivalent to the ‘A-level’ with a minimum of one year in office. Appointment at this 
level usually requires a university degree. Hence, the sample of this survey is the 
total universe of ‘A-level’ civil servants in Norwegian ministries. The surveys at the 
agency level were distributed to a random selection of every third official at the ‘A-
level’ with at least one year in office. The main reason for selecting only a random 
number of agency officials is the large staff numbers in the agencies. Together, these 
surveys represent the most thorough screening of the Norwegian central 
administration, and are also probably among the most extensive surveys of domestic 
central administrations in international comparison (see also Geuijen et al. 2008). 
Table 1 shows the sizes of the samples and response rates in the ministry and agency 
surveys from 1986, 1996 and 2006. 
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Table 1 Sample sizes and response rates in the ministry and agency surveys, 1986, 
1996 and 2006 
                                                          Ministry surveys           Agency surveys 
 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
N 1185 1497 1874 1072 1024 1452 
Response rates 72 % 72 % 67 % 68 % 64 % 59 % 
 
 
Two caveats are needed: As in most social sciences based on interview and survey 
data, the observations reported in this article rest on the perceptions of the 
respondents. Admittedly, there are no guarantees that actors’ perceptions of 
administrative behavior always reflect actual behavior. Studying actors’ perceptions 
render the conclusions vulnerable to perceptual errors. However, by using large-N 
data from two different groups of respondents at three different points in time render 
the conclusions less subject to random distributions and methodological errors. 
Secondly, the effects of organizational duplication are only possible to discern within 
the agency surveys because this variable was never included in the ministry surveys. 
Concomitantly, a complete statistical control of organizational duplication is not 
possible.  
 
Finally, to what extent are our empirical observations generalizable? The sheer 
statistical distribution of agencification across countries should not in itself matter 
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with regard to the effects of agencification on the potential for political steering. These 
effects are arguably conditioned by particular organizational forms, not by the 
statistical distribution of these forms. Although a reluctant reformer, the Norwegian 
government is nevertheless an integral part of the OECD area, thus sharing many of 
the key characteristics of the constituent states (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). 
Secondly, the impact of agencification on the potential for political steering as 
observed in this article may also be relevant at other levels of governance than the 
national one. For example, agencification at the EU level has accompanied more than 
30 agency-like bodies organized at arm’s length from the Community institutions in 
Brussels. Thus, the results reported in our study might be of some relevance also for 
understanding agencification effects at the European level (Trondal and Jeppesen 
2008).   
 
How does agencification matter? 
In this section we present the survey results. First, a general overview of the signals 
and considerations deemed important by officials at the ministerial department level 
and the agency level respectively is provided. Observations are available at three 
points in time: 1986, 1996 and 2006. Table 2 reveals a considerable difference between 
ministry and agency officials as regards their attentiveness to signals from executive 
politicians. This difference is quite clear across time, although agency personnel 
assign somewhat more weight to political signals in 2006 than before. Professional 
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considerations are deemed important by an overwhelming majority at both levels at 
all three points in time. User and client concerns rank relatively high and particularly 
so at the agency level where such concerns are more frequently evoked than political 
concerns.  
 
Table 2 Percent government officials who consider the following signals and 
considerations important when doing their worka,b 
Administrative level: Ministry officials Agency officials 
Year: 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
Signals from the political leadership 
(cabinet, minister, state secretary) 
 
90 
 
89 
 
89 
 
53 
 
58 
 
67 
Professional considerations 90 91 95 92 93 94 
Signals from users, clients, affected parties  67 58 67 80 71 77 
Mean N 794 1435 1848 635 975 1333 
a) This table combines value 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly 
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
b) Comparing Mean N for 1986 with sample size for 1986 (Table 1), the number of missing values seems 
rather high. The reason is that the 1986 questionnaire included a filter question that allowed only those 
exercising a certain amount of discretion to answer the question on importance attached to various 
signals. Thus, those not exercising the required amount of discretion are added to the missing values 
cases. 
 
 
In Table 3 we investigate whether organizational structure matters when controlling 
for the kind of tasks officials have. As expected, a larger proportion of those 
spending much of their working time on political tasks - that is tasks with a lot of 
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discretion - consider signals from executive politicians as important compared to 
those not having such tasks. We also find that although officials at both levels are 
involved in legislative proposals, there is a considerable difference in terms of 
political sensitivity depending on their organizational position. Agency personnel are 
significantly less attentive to political signals than their counterparts within 
ministerial departments even when they engage in typically political decision-
making, such as law preparation. The pattern is quite consistent across the three 
points in time.   
 
Table 3 Percent officials who consider political signalsa from the political 
leadership (cabinet, minister, state secretary) important, by working time devoted 
to making/changing laws, regulations, agreements, conventionsb 
Adm. level: Ministry officials Agency officials 
Year: 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
Working time 
devoted to 
making/changing 
laws, regulations, 
agreements, 
conventions: 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
 
 
 
Much 
 
 
 
Little 
Signals from the 
political 
leadership 
 
95 
 
88 
 
95 
 
88 
 
96 
 
85 
 
63 
 
51 
 
75 
 
55 
 
76 
 
59 
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N 169 619 299 1044 403 1471 82 529 123 787 175 1277 
a) This variable combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly 
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
b) This variable is dichotomous with the following values: value 1 (“Much”) combines the following two 
original values: very dominating part of working time (value 1), fairly dominating part of working time 
(value 2). Value 2 (“Little”) combines the following three original values: some working time (value 3), 
fairly little working time (value 4), very little/no working time (value 5).   
 
 
By controlling for the degree to which political debate takes place within an issue 
area we also, as for legislative work, try to find out whether the political salience of a 
policy field matters as regards officials’ attentiveness to signals from their executive 
politicians. The question on public debate was not posed in 1996. Table 4 shows, as 
expected, that public debate tends to make officials more politically sensitive. 
However, the impact of organizational structure is at the same time pretty clear: 
Even if the level of public debate is kept constant, a considerably smaller proportion 
of agency personnel attach importance to signals from executive politicians 
compared to ministry personnel. Again, the finding is quite consistent across time.   
 
Table 4 Percent officials who consider political signalsa from the political 
leadership (cabinet, minister, state secretary) important, by the degree of public 
debate on the issue area that the officials are working onb 
Adm. level: Ministry officials Agency officials 
Year: 1986 2006 1986 2006 
Political         
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contestation: High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Signals from 
the political 
leadership 
 
94 
 
83 
 
95 
 
80 
 
67 
 
47 
 
77 
 
64 
N 465 330 973 901 185 426 132 193 
a) This variable combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly 
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
b) This variable is dichotomous with the following values: value 1 combines the following two original 
values: to a very large extent (value 1), to a fairly large extent (value 2). Value 2 combines the following 
three original values: both/and (value 3), to a fairly little extent (value 4), to a very little extent (value 
5).   
 
 
In Table 5 we control for the effect of officials’ rank. As expected, a larger proportion 
of senior officials consider political signals to be important compared to lower level 
personnel. However, by keeping level of position constant we see that organizational 
affiliation (ministerial department versus agency) makes a significant difference: 
Agency personnel are clearly less inclined to deem signals from executive politicians 
as important as their counterparts within ministerial departments.  
 
Table 5 Percent officials who consider political signalsa from the political 
leadership (cabinet, minister, state secretary) important, by positional levelb  
Adm. level: Ministry officials Agency officials 
Year: 1986 1996 2006 1986 1996 2006 
Positional level: High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Signals from the 96 84 94 84 94 82 61 45 68 52 73 62 
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political 
leadership 
N 377 418 737 698 1030 789 275 337 332 609 578 730 
a) This variable combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly 
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
b) This variable is dichotomous with the following values at the ministry level: A high position includes 
the following ranks: Principal officer/adviser, Assistant director general/adviser, Deputy director 
general/adviser, Director general/adviser, and positions over the level of Director general. A low 
position includes the following ranks: Executive officer, higher executive officer/adviser. At the agency 
level a high position includes the following four ranks: Principal adviser/adviser, Assistant director 
general/adviser, Deputy director general/adviser, and Director or equivalent. A low position includes 
executive officer, higher executive officer/adviser. 
 
 
Since the 2006 data also contain a common file for ministry and agency officials (cf. 
Data and Method Section), it is possible to run a multiple regression analysis 
including the four independent variables dealt with so far. Table 6 shows that the 
amount of political debate within a policy field and officials’ organizational position 
(ministry versus agency) are both fairly strongly related to officials’ political 
attentiveness. The position level of personnel and their tasks are much weaker 
related to attentiveness although the relationships are statistically significant.  Our 
primary purpose is to demonstrate that agencification (organizational position) has 
an independent effect, which indeed seems to be the case. However, at the same time 
the variables included explain a considerable part of the variance of the dependent 
variable.   
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Table 6 Summary of factors affecting officials’ perceptions of the importance of 
signals from the political leadership (Standardised Beta coefficients. Linear 
regressions on ministry and agency officials, 2006 data) a 
b. Organizational position (ministry versus agency)b 
c. Working time on making/changing laws, regulations, 
agreements, conventionsc 
d. Public debated 
e. Level of positione 
.25** 
 
.12** 
.28** 
.13** 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F Statistic  
Significance F 
.24 
.24 
213.662 
.000 
*) p ≤ 0.05         **) p ≤ 0.01                                                                                       
Original question: “How much importance to you put on the following considerations and signals when you do 
your work?” 
a) The dependent variable in this table has an ordinal scale with the following values: very important 
(value 1), fairly important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very 
unimportant (value 5).  
b) Value 1: Ministry official, value 2: agency official.  
c) This variable has the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly important (value 2), 
both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
d) This variable has the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (value 1), to a fairly great extent 
(value 2), both/and (value 3), to a fairly little extent (value 4), to a very little extent (value 5). 
e) This variable has the following five values: Director general or higher levels/adviser/Director or 
equivalent (value 1), deputy director general (value 2), Assistant director general/adviser (value 3), 
Principal officer/adviser (value 4), Executive officer, higher executive officer/adviser (value 5). 
 
 
Agency personnel have, at all three points in time, been asked to what extent their 
parent ministerial departments contain organizational units that duplicate or overlap 
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the portfolio of their respective agencies. Table 7 unveils that such duplication indeed 
makes a difference as regards political attentiveness at the agency level. Consistently 
across time, approximately 70 percent of those experiencing duplication assign 
importance to signals from the political leadership while this holds for only about 40 
percent of those not having this experience. However, in comparison, we should 
remember that about 90 percent of ministry personnel attach importance to signals 
from above. In Table 8 we present a multiple regression analysis showing the relative 
effect of the independent variables, including organizational duplication, on the 
importance of political signals from executive politicians. As said, this analysis can 
only cover agency personnel. Therefore, the analysis does not include the variable 
‘organizational position’. Table 8 serves to demonstrate that organizational 
duplication, tasks and position level all have a moderate effect while public debate 
again turns out to be more strongly related to officials’ political attentiveness.  
 
Table 7 Percent agency officials who consider political signalsa from the political 
leadership (cabinet, minister, state secretary) important, by organisational 
duplication between the agencies and the ministriesb  
Year: 1986 1996 2006 
Organisational 
duplication: 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
Signals from the       
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political leadership 68 40 71 43 72 47 
N 270 343 498 448 831 621 
a) This variable combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly 
important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
b) This variable is dichotomous with the following values: Organisational duplication (Yes) includes the 
following original values: Yes, overlapping ministerial department (value 1), yes, overlapping offices, 
sections etc (value 2). No organisational duplication (No) includes the following original values: yes, 
overlapping single position(s) (value 3), no, no particular overlapping units/positions (value 4).   
 
 
Table 8 Summary of factors affecting agency officials’ perceptions of the 
importance of signals from the political leadership (Standardised Beta coefficients. 
Linear regressions on agency officials, 2006 data) a 
b. Organisational duplication between agency and parent 
ministryb 
c. Working time on making/changing laws, regulations, 
agreements, conventionsc                                         
d. Level of positiond 
e. Public debatee  
 
.13** 
 
.10** 
.13** 
.24** 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F Statistic  
Significance F 
.14 
.14 
47.009 
.000 
*) p ≤ 0.05         **) p ≤ 0.01                                                                                       
Original question: “How much importance to you put on the following considerations and signals when you do 
your work?” 
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a. The dependent variable in this table has an ordinal scale with the following values: very important 
(value 1), fairly important (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very 
unimportant (value 5).  
b. This variable is dichotomous with the following values:  value 1 includes the following original 
values: Yes, departments (value 1), yes, offices, sections etc (value 2). Value 2 includes the following 
original values: yes, single position(s) (value 3), no, no particular units/positions (value 4). 
c. This variable has the following five-point scale: very important (value 1), fairly important (value 2), 
both/and (value 3), fairly unimportant (value 4), very unimportant (value 5). 
d. This variable has the following values: Director or equivalent (value 1), Deputy director 
general/adviser (value 2), Assistant director general/adviser (value 3), Principal officer/adviser (value 
4), Executive officer, Higher executive officer/adviser (value 5). 
e. This variable has the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (value 1), to a fairly great extent 
(value 2), both/and (value 3), to a fairly little extent (value 4), to a very little extent (value 5). 
 
 
Discussion 
The organizational setting within which decision-making takes place seems to make 
a clear difference: Officials within ministerial departments are significantly more 
sensitive to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts within national 
agencies. The relationship is a robust one: it holds when controlling for type of tasks, 
the amount of public debate and contestation and officials’ rank. Last, but not least, 
the findings are highly consistent across time. We have also seen that almost all 
officials, regardless of organizational position, deem professional considerations as 
important in their daily work. At the agency level, the more modest attention to 
political signals from above seems partly ‘compensated for’ by more emphasis on 
user and client interests. This may illustrate that the autonomous institution is 
seldom found; more autonomy gained in one relationship may be followed by more 
dependence in another relationship (Olsen 2008; Thatcher 2002). Thus, officials 
routinely have to cope with what might become competing expectations.  
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Our findings seem to be relatively independent of shifting administrative doctrines. 
Although NPM reforms may have resulted in an increased number of agencies, the 
effects are quite stable across time. However, since it is often assumed that the 
relationship between formal structure and actual behaviour is relatively weak in this 
respect (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2006), we might have expected that changing 
doctrines could have made a difference as regards agency decision-making. This is 
not the case: the proportion of agency personnel emphasizing political signals is not 
smaller in 1996 (the NPM period) than it was in 1986 (the pre-NPM period). User and 
clientele concerns did not come more to the fore during the NPM period. Agency 
personnel seem to become slightly more sensitive to political considerations in 2006. 
This could be interpreted as stemming from post-NPM doctrines like the ‘joined-up 
government’ trend. It is, however, more likely that this rather moderate change is 
due to an increasing level of political conflict and public debate.2 As shown in the 
former section, the level of public debate is significantly related to officials’ political 
attentiveness. Studies that have documented weak relationships between agencies’ 
degree of formal autonomy and real autonomy (Lægreid et al. 2006; Yesilkagit and 
Thiel 2008) are compatible with the findings reported in this article: Our study 
provides data on agency decision-making as well as ministry decision-making and 
shows that organizational position (ministry vs. agency) makes a significant 
difference. 
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Our study adds to a knowledge basis for organizational design. One design 
implication is that if control by executive politicians is the overriding concern, 
portfolios should be organized solely as integrated ministries. If, on the other hand, 
one wants to mute signals from the political leadership and to some extent insulate 
professional considerations from political concerns, agencification is an option. 
Agencification may also lead to more weight being assigned to user and client 
interests. In a legislative process the existence of agencies thus underpins the role of 
‘un-politicized’ expert advice, however, it may also strengthen the involvement of 
directly affected parties in the process. As regards implementation processes, such as 
law application, agencies may safeguard more equal treatment of individual cases 
across time regardless of shifting ministers of various political colours. If one aims at 
enhancing political steering while keeping agencies for other reasons, the 
establishment of organizational units within ministerial departments that overlap 
agency portfolios is an alternative. As shown, such organizational duplication boosts 
agency personnel’s political attentiveness without annulling the difference that 
agencification makes in this respect.  
 
National agencies organized at arm’s length from their parent ministerial 
departments and which also in practice are partly encapsulated from direct steering 
from these departments constitute an administrative infrastructure that is relatively 
open for capture by external actors. We are here not thinking about ‘agency capture’ 
by clientele or regulatees (slightly touched upon above) but about national agencies 
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in European countries partly becoming building blocks of a multi-level EU 
administration. The main EU executive body, the European Commission, lacks its 
own agencies at the national level for the implementation of EU policies. In order to 
create more uniform implementation across the Union there are indications that the 
European Commission in cooperation with EU-level agencies establishes kind of 
partnerships with national agencies for this purpose, partly circumventing 
ministerial departments. National agencies are thus becoming ‘double-hatted’, or 
‘multi-hatted’, serving both national ministries and EU-level bodies (Egeberg 2006; 
Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Martens 2008). Agency de-coupling (from ministerial 
departments) at the national level makes agency re-coupling across levels of 
governance possible. Integrated ministries would not have been conducive to such a 
development. Thus, re-coupling (‘de-agencification’) at the national level would 
seriously challenge administrative integration across levels of governance. 
 
Conclusion 
Agencification has, probably due to the NPM phenomenon, been high on the agenda 
of administrative policy-makers for a couple of decades. However, one of the 
enduring themes of public administration is whether a government portfolio should 
be organized as an integrated ministry or as a dual organization composed of a 
ministerial department and one or several semi-detached national agencies. 
Although many studies have documented systematic effects of agencification on 
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bureaucratic behaviour, such as less political control of decision-making at the 
agency level, doubt has been raised as regards the robustness of these findings. Quite 
reasonable questions have been asked in this respect: Is it not reason to believe that if 
one controls for the effect of tasks (more or less ‘political’), the amount of public 
debate and conflict within a policy field, or officials’ rank, one could very well find 
that agencification effects might disappear? In fact all these three factors have an 
independent effect on officials’ political attentiveness, however, they do not at all 
annul the impact of agencification. In addition, overlapping organizational resources 
within ministerial departments seem to affect the importance attached to political 
signals. Our findings are remarkably consistent across three points in time, spanning 
two decades and shifting administrative doctrines. 
 
This article has focused on the weight assigned to signals from executive politicians. 
As a by-product, though, it has been shown that professional considerations are very 
much alluded to at either level. Agency personnel emphasize user and client interests 
more than their counterparts within ministerial departments; they even rank such 
concerns higher than a steer from their political masters. We have also argued that 
the relative de-coupling of agencies, not only formally but also in practice, from the 
hierarchical chain of command has created an administrative infrastructure that may 
be highly conducive to re-coupling of national agencies in European countries into 
an emerging multi-level EU executive. Finally, we have pointed to some potential 
implications of our study for organizational design.   
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 This article is financially supported by the Norwegian Research Council (“EUROTRANS: 
The transformation and sustainability of European Political Orders”). Thanks to two 
anonymous referees for valuable comments. 
2
 Our data show that while in 1986 29 percent of agency officials reported that there was 
much public debate within their respective policy fields, 46 percent said the same in 2006.    
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